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In this paper, we consider a region that invests in infrastructure used by both 
local demand and through transport. We then compare transport systems that have, for 
a given capacity, the same total infrastructure cost but vary in the proportion of fixed 
costs and variable capacity costs. We show, first, that infrastructure which has (ceteris 
paribus) a higher share of fixed costs leads to higher welfare for the regional 
government building it. Contrary to what is commonly believed, it therefore requires 
less, rather than more, federal subsidies. Second, we find that, even for capacity 
characterized by, ceteris paribus, very high shares of fixed costs, financing of 
infrastructure is generally not an important issue as long as regions are allowed to toll 
through traffic. Third, if member states cannot toll through traffic, or if a federal 
authority (such as the EU or the USA) can impose pricing at the global marginal 
social cost, our analysis shows that this reduces investment incentives for the 
individual regions, and subsidies may be needed. We discuss the policy implications 
of these findings and illustrate all theoretical results numerically.   
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0. Introduction  
 
Both in academic and policy circles it is often argued that there are two 
reasons why the provision and funding of transport capacity in a country or region 
may be quite problematic. First, if a region faces a lot of through traffic, it will have 
limited incentives to invest, unless it can charge high tolls on through traffic (see, e.g., 
De Borger,Dunkerley, Proost (2007)). The reason is that, when making decisions, the 
regional government typically cares about the welfare of the local users of the 
infrastructure, the costs of capacity investments and possible revenues from user 
charges; however, it is likely to take into account neither the benefits of the 
infrastructure for foreign users nor their time losses due to possible congestion. Since 
any benefits from investment partially flow abroad, in the form of time gains for 
through traffic, this results in inefficiently low investment.  
Second, funding of infrastructure capacity may be difficult when there are 
high fixed costs of capacity expansion. This argument goes back to the literature on 
cost recovery of transport investments (see, e.g., Mohring and Harwitz (1962), Small 
(1982), and Arnott and Kraus (1998)). This literature considers a decision maker 
interested in optimal investment in transport capacity and optimal user charges for use 
of the infrastructure. It shows that, if use of the infrastructure is priced at marginal 
social cost, the degree of cost recovery of an optimal transport investment strongly 
depends on the cost structure of capacity expansion. For example, assuming perfectly 
divisible capacity and a user cost function that is homogeneous of degree zero in 
volume and capacity (i.e., cost depends on the volume-capacity ratio only), optimal 
pricing implies exact cost recovery if there are constant returns to scale in capacity 
provision. More generally, the cost recovery ratio equals the elasticity of the capacity 
cost function with respect to capacity so that, for infrastructure with increasing returns 
to scale involving high fixed costs, deficits result
1. The policy implication of this 
literature is that the funding of capacity investments may be problematic for 
                                                 
1 As shown in Morrisson (1983), Zhang and Zhang (2003), and de Palma and Lindsey (2007), these 
results have to be amended when the underlying assumptions do not hold. The overall message remains 
broadly the same, however.   2
infrastructures with high fixed costs; subsidies may be needed to implement marginal 
cost pricing
2.  
The above arguments have strongly influenced actual policy making. The 
reduction in investment incentives by local governments when through traffic is 
important has been one of the principle motivations in the EU and the US to subsidize 
interstate or cross-border transport investments. Moreover, the difficulty of cost 
recovery and the associated funding problems in the case of high fixed cost 
infrastructures largely explains recent policies in the EU, where member countries can 
apply for federal grants for their cross-border infrastructure projects within the 
framework of the Trans European Networks (TEN’s). So far, the focus of these 
subsidies has been much more on rail and inland waterway investments 
(infrastructures with high fixed costs) than on road.  
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the role of the cost structure of 
capacity investments and of the presence of through traffic for investment incentives, 
for welfare and for cost recovery. This seems desirable for several reasons. First, the 
literature stressing the role of high fixed capacity costs has almost exclusively focused 
on issues of cost recovery, and much less on the welfare effects of different cost 
structures. For example, a relevant unanswered question is whether infrastructures 
with high fixed capacity costs (e.g. rail) generate more welfare for a region, and will 
therefore more easily be build, than an infrastructure with close to constant returns to 
scale in capacity expansion (e.g., roads)? Second, the available cost recovery 
theorems have been derived in a setting where a policy maker for a single region 
decides on capacity and pricing of an infrastructure that is only used by local 
transport; optimal pricing then implies charging users at marginal social cost. When 
countries face through transport, however, the literature shows that they will, in the 
absence of regulation, charge prices above the marginal social cost. This ‘tax-
exporting’ behavior allows them to generate more revenues on through traffic (see 
Arnott and Grieson (1981) and, in a transport setting, Levinson (2001) and De Borger, 
et al.(2007)). It is intuitively clear that the relation between the cost structure of 
capacity investment and revenues through user charges may then become much more 
                                                 
2 Whether or not scale economies in capacity provision strongly reduce investment incentives in 
practice depends on the cost for the government to generate public funds. As long as a government can 
rely on public revenue that is not too costly, high fixed costs in capacity provision may not prevent 
implementation of the ideal investment and pricing combination, whatever the structure of the cost 
function.   3
subtle than in the case without through traffic. It will not only depend on the capacity 
cost structure but also on countries’ autonomy is deciding on tolls for infrastructure 
use.  
In this paper, we therefore study the relation between the cost structure of 
capacity expansion (i.e., the relative share of fixed costs), welfare and cost recovery in 
a setting where an infrastructure is used both by local users and by through traffic. 
Prototype examples of such a setting is a country within the EU or a state in the USA. 
We obtain several interesting results. First, we show that infrastructures that have, for 
a given total cost, a large fixed cost component, are beneficial to a welfare 
maximizing country. Therefore, countries have higher incentives to invest so that, 
contrary to what is commonly believed, such investments require less, rather than 
more, federal subsidies. This result is shown to hold both in the case with and without 
through traffic. Second, in the case with both local and through traffic demand we 
find that, even for capacity characterized by very high shares of fixed costs, financing 
of infrastructure is generally not an important issue as long as regions are allowed to 
toll the use of the infrastructure. When the infrastructure can be priced by the regional 
governments, it is therefore no longer clear whether a high share of fixed costs of 
capacity expansion is a hurdle for the funding of investments. If the regional 
government is restricted (e.g., by regulation imposed by a higher-level federal 
government such as the EU) in its pricing policies, this reduces regions’ investment 
incentives and subsidies may be justified. In general, whether funding problems arise 
depends, among others, on who is responsible for toll and capacity decisions, on the 
importance of through traffic, and on the structure of the capacity cost function.  
These results have clear policy implications. For example, they suggest that 
the EU’s emphasis of subsidies for cross-border infrastructures with high fixed costs 
may be misguided. Moreover, they suggest that the EU should not subsidize the 
provision of infrastructure at all in countries facing substantial through traffic and 
tolling can be decided by the member states. Finally, if member states cannot toll 
through traffic, or if the EU can impose socially optimal pricing on the transport 
corridor, then subsidies may well be justified to stimulate investment incentives.  
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the model set up. 
Section 2 discusses the case of one isolated region with and without through traffic. 
Section 3 illustrates with a numerical example the importance of the cost structure. A 
final section concludes.    4
 
1.  Model formulation  
 
  In this section, we formulate the model to analyze the role of the cost structure 
(presence of high fixed costs of capacity expansion) for investment decisions, for cost 
recovery and for welfare. It is assumed that the infrastructure is build and operated by 
a region that faces both local and through traffic. We use a model set up close to De 
Borger et al. (2007), but as they use a proportional capacity cost structure, they 
neglect issues related to the structure of the cost function.  
 
1.1. Demand, prices, and user cost specification 
 
  Demand for local transport in a given region is represented by the strictly 
downward sloping and twice differentiable inverse demand function ()
Y P Y , where  
Y is the demand for transport in the region by local inhabitants. Overall demand for 
through traffic through A is described analogously by the strictly downward sloping 
inverse demand function ( )
X P X , where X is the through traffic flow. Note that prices 
are generalised prices; they include resource costs, time costs, and possible user 
charges. We focus throughout on the case where user charges are the same for local 
and through traffic
3.  The uniform toll is denoted by θ .  
    The generalised user costs for local transport and for through traffic, denoted 
as
Y g  and
X g  respectively, equal the sum of the time and resource costs of travel, plus 
the toll. Since local and through traffic both use the same infrastructure, we have:  
      ()
Y gC q θ =+ .        
      ()
X gC q θ =+        





= . HereVX Y = + is the total transport volume, and Z  
denotes capacity. The user cost function is twice differentiable and strictly increasing 
in the total traffic volume relative to capacity.                        
                                                 
3 We briefly report on the results for other pricing structures (e.g., toll differentiation between local and 
through traffic) at the end of Section 2. There we also discuss a more general setting of a transport 
corridor with several regions that engage in tax competition. This does not change the main insights 
from the analysis.    5
  In the absence of corner solutions, transport equilibrium for through traffic and 
local traffic implies equality between generalized prices and costs: 
    () ( )
XX PX g C qθ = =+                                    (1)
    () ()
YY PY g C q θ == +       (2) 
Differentiation of this system of equilibrium conditions and solving by Cramer’s rule 
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. As expected, a 
higher toll in the region implies lower demand for both local and through traffic. A 
capacity increase raises both demands.        
     
1.2. Capacity costs and the isocost- isocapacity locus   
 
  To model different cost structures for capacity expansion, we have chosen for 
the simplest possible approach. Different degrees of returns to scale are captured by a 
linear capacity cost function. Let C(Z) represent total capacity cost, then the cost 
function is given by: 
    C(Z)= F + k Z            (5)  
In this expression, F is a fixed cost and k is a constant marginal cost of capacity 
expansion. The degree of returns to scale can then be varied by changing, for a given 
Z, the share of the fixed and variable costs, i.e., by manipulating the parameters k and 
F. To see this, note that the degree of returns to scale can be measured by the inverse 
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. This specification therefore implies constant 
returns if the fixed capacity cost is zero; increasing the relative importance of the 
fixed cost yields a higher degree of increasing returns.     6
To study the implications of differences in the cost structure of capacity 
provision between, say, road and rail, it will be instructive to introduce the concept of 
an isocost-isocapacity locus {C°,Z°}≡{F≥0,k≥0 : F+kZ°=C°}. It is defined as the set 
of linear capacity cost functions that have the same total capacity cost C° for a given 
level of capacity Z°. The concept is illustrated in Figure 1. For a reference level of 
capacity Z° and a total cost level C°, we can define all combinations of marginal 
capacity costs k and fixed costs F that generate the same total cost C°. All such 
combinations are given by a linear relation. Intersection of the isocost-isocapacity 
locus with the vertical axis reflects an infrastructure with zero fixed capacity costs but 
high marginal capacity expansion cost  1 k , so that 
00
1 () CZ kZ = . The intersection with 
the horizontal axis reflects the extreme case of an infrastructure which can be 
expanded at zero marginal cost
4; there is just a fixed cost 
0
1 () CZ F = . Varying the 
fixed and variable cost parameters allows us to describe, along this locus, a wide 
range of capacity cost structures in terms of the relative shares of fixed and variable 
costs in total costs. For example, for given Z°, rail infrastructure will typically be 
situated much further to the right than road infrastructure, which has a lower fixed 
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Figure 1: Isocost-isocapacity locus   
 
                                                 
4  In the latter extreme case, of course, the notion of capacity and congestion looses its standard 
meaning, since capacity can be expanded without extra cost.    
   7
 
1.3. The objective function of the government  
 
  We assume that the objective function of the regional government captures the 
benefits for local users (net of user costs), toll revenues and capacity costs:  





reg WP y d y g Y Y X F k Z θ =− + + − − ∫                 (7) 
Note that we assume the regional government ignores the user benefits of foreign 
users; only the revenues they yield are taken into account (and their contribution to 
congestion, via the generalized prices). Of course, a higher-level government (say, the 
EU or the federal level in the USA) that would capture also the benefits for through 
traffic in the region would judge policies differently. Such a “federal” objective 






fed WP y d y g Y Y P x d x g X X F k Z θθ =− + +− + − − ∫∫            (8) 
     
 
2.  The structure of capacity costs, welfare and cost recovery: theoretical 
analysis  
 
  In this section, we assume the region is responsible for pricing and capacity 
decisions. We then study what the implications are of differences in the share of fixed 
capacity costs for capacity provision, for welfare of the region, and for the cost 
recovery ratio. To do so, let us assume that for a benchmark constant returns to scale 
cost structure (zero fixed capacity costs), it is optimal for the regional government to 
provide positive transport capacity ( 0 Z > ). For this given capacity, we then analyze 
what happens when we alter the cost structure, along the isocost-isocapacity locus, 
towards higher shares of fixed capacity costs. To make the intuition of the results to 
be derived as transparent as possible, we proceed in several steps. We first consider 
the effect of altering the cost structure in the case of an isolated region without foreign 
traffic; a next step introduces through traffic. Finally, we briefly discuss extensions of 
the analysis to other settings.   
 
2.1. The case of a single region with only local demand 
  Suppose an isolated region only has local transport. It decides on investment 
and transport tax levels by maximizing regional welfare. Now start from the   8
benchmark case with zero fixed infrastructure costs, and then decrease the variable 
cost (hence raise the fixed cost above zero) along the isocost-isocapacity line. 
Graphically, starting on the intersection with the vertical axis, we consider a 
movement from left to right along the linear relation depicted in Figure 1. We 
formally show in Appendix 1 that such a movement implies that welfare cannot 
decrease, and will in fact rise.  
The intuition behind this result is simple. Indeed, note that the same level of 
capacity as the one selected in the benchmark solution without fixed costs is still 
feasible. If the same capacity level were chosen, the cost structure would be different 
but the total cost and regional welfare would be identical to the benchmark. However, 
the change in the cost structure implies that the marginal cost of a unit of additional 
capacity has decreased. This implies it becomes interesting to add more capacity and 
realize reductions in travel user costs. As a consequence, regional welfare increases.  
Infrastructures which have, for a given total cost, ceteris paribus, a large fixed 
cost component, are therefore more beneficial to a welfare maximizing region. 
However, although welfare rises, optimal pricing of the use of the infrastructure does 
imply that a higher share of fixed costs is likely to decrease the cost recovery ratio. To 
see this, first note that the cost recovery ratio in the given region is defined as toll 
revenues relative to capacity costs: 






       (9)   
Now consider optimal pricing and investment behavior by the regional government. 





reg WP y d y g Y Y F k Z θ =− + − − ∫  
Maximizing with respect to θ  and Z  yields, using the equality between generalized 
price and generalized cost in equilibrium, the following toll and capacity rules, 
respectively: 




θ =   






=    9
The optimal toll rule just says that the toll equals the marginal external congestion 
cost; optimal capacity is obtained when the marginal cost and benefit of extra capacity 






                   (10)  
The cost recovery ratio is just the share of variable costs in total capacity 
costs, a simple application of the general rules derived by Mohring and Harwitz 
(1962). The ratio equals the elasticity of capacity cost with respect to capacity (see 
(6)). Although changes in the cost structure obviously affect optimal capacity Z this 
does suggest that, the higher the importance of fixed costs, the lower the cost recovery 
ratio, given optimal pricing
5. This is the basis for financing concerns in policy circles 
with respect to infrastructure investment involving high fixed costs.   
We summarize our findings as Proposition 1 below.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: Assume a linear capacity cost function. Consider a regional 
government that maximizes regional welfare and faces only local transport 
demand. Then a higher share of fixed capacity costs along an isocost-isocapacity 
line: (i) increases regional welfare, but (ii) reduces the cost-recovery ratio.  
 
  This proposition implies a dilemma: systems with high fixed costs are, ceteris 
paribus, welfare-improving but also raise the deficit
6. The latter phenomenon has been 
stressed in the cost recovery literature; the former has somewhat been overlooked.  
 
2.2. The case of a single region with local and through traffic 
  In many federal states, a local infrastructure is also used by non residents. 
However, following the same argument as before, one again easily shows that a 
higher share of fixed costs can only improve welfare. Indeed, as long as the regional 
government has full control of the pricing and investment decisions, it can always 
stick to the policy that was optimal in the case with lower fixed costs; hence, it 
produces at least the same regional welfare as before. But since the decrease in 
                                                 
5 Taking into account the impact of the cost structure on capacity, one easily shows that the effect of 
higher fixed costs along an isocost-isocapacity line on the cost recovery ratio is negative if the 
elasticity of demand with respect to capacity is smaller than one.  
6 Note that the welfare maximizing problem of the regional government implicitly assumes a cost of 
funds equal to one; no extra weight is given to toll revenues. This implies that as long as only local 
users make use of the infrastructure and the regional government has access to public funds whose 
marginal cost is not too far above one, a lower cost recovery ratio is not inconsistent with higher 
regional welfare.    10
marginal capacity cost makes extra capacity beneficial, higher capacity will be chosen 
and welfare rises. The formal proof is provided in Appendix 2. 
  The presence of through traffic does have important implications for cost 
recovery. The regional government now has an interest in tax exporting by raising the 
user charge above the marginal cost (see, e.g., Levinson (2001), De Borger et al. 
(2007)). The cost recovery ratio is now: 








                    (11) 
The optimal toll and capacity rules that follow from maximizing the objective 
function (7) can be written as, after simple algebra (also see De Borger et al. (2007)):  
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                 (13) 
where, as before, VX Y =+ is the total transport flow on the regional link. Note that 
the pricing rule (12) indeed implies tax exporting: the toll is higher than marginal 
social cost, since the second term on the right hand side is positive and increasing in 
the importance of through traffic. Optimal capacity sets the net benefit (benefit at 
constant transport volume due to time savings minus the cost due to induced transport 
volumes plus extra toll revenues) equal to marginal capacity cost.  
Combining (12) and (13) yields, after simple algebra: 
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Substituting this result into the cost recovery expression (11) leads to:  
   











                   (14) 
where  Z ε  is the elasticity of total transport demand (local plus through traffic) with 
respect to capacity increases. So:  








                   (15)   11
Using (4), it follows that  1 Z ε < : a capacity increase raises total transport demand less 
than proportionately. 
Interpretation of (14) is easy. First note that, if there is no through traffic, we 
have the same rule as in the case of local traffic only (see (10)). Second, the presence 
of foreign users implies that cost recovery need not be a problem, even for very high 
fixed costs. The second term in the numerator of (14) suggests that the cost recovery 
ratio is a rising function of the importance of through traffic. For substantial through 
traffic levels, (14) suggests that the cost recovery ratio can easily exceed one. Note 
also that it is now not obvious at all that raising the importance of the fixed cost 
F will reduce the cost recovery ratio, since all terms in the numerator depend on this 
share as well.  
Note that this result on cost recovery hinges on the assumption of regional 
authority over pricing the infrastructure. If the region is restricted in its pricing 
policies, this has obvious implications for cost recovery. To see this, note that the 
optimal regional toll rule (12) can be rewritten, using (3) and remembering 
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The first term on the right hand side is the global marginal external congestion cost, 
capturing both the time losses of local and through traffic demand. The second term is 
positive, implying that the toll exceeds the global marginal external cost. Now 
suppose that a federal authority imposes tolling at the global marginal external cost. 
This prevents the region from charging its preferred (higher) toll. On the one hand, 
investment incentives are reduced because of lower benefits of extra capacity 
investment (see (13)); on the other hand, demand by local users increases due to lower 
tolls, raising investment incentives. The effects on capacity and cost recovery are a 
priori unclear.  
  We summarize the results of this subsection in Proposition 2. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Assume a linear capacity cost function. Consider a regional 
government that maximizes regional welfare but faces both local and through 
traffic demand. Then:  
(i)  A higher share of fixed capacity costs along an isocost-isocapacity line 
increases welfare   12
(ii)  Even for high fixed cost infrastructures, funding problems are 
unlikely to arise if through traffic demand is substantial and regions 
can decide autonomously on user charges due to tax exporting 
behaviour by the regional government.  
(iii)  Cost recovery may be a problem if regions are restricted in their 
policies, e.g., if they are restricted to price at marginal social cost  
 
2.3. Extensions: alternative pricing regimes and multiple competing regions 
The model used in this section was extremely simple. However, the main 
insights do not change in a qualitative sense when extending the model in various 
directions.  
When showing that higher shares of fixed infrastructure costs were welfare-
improving, we assumed uniform tolls throughout. Interestingly, this finding holds 
quite generally for various alternative pricing instruments as well. Suppose, for 
example, that different pricing instruments are used that allow toll differentiation 
between local and through traffic. Alternatively, assume only local transport can be 
taxed, e.g., because of the use of fuel taxes in a small region. In both cases, welfare 
increases at higher fixed cost shares, for the same reasons as in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
Interestingly, the proposition even holds when no user charges can be implemented at 
all, and notwithstanding the fact that through traffic is decreasing the welfare of the 
local users. The main explanation for the positive welfare effect is, again, that the 
lower marginal capacity cost increases the optimal capacity level; this also benefits 
local users.   
Cost recovery results, of course, do depend on the pricing instruments used. In 
the case of toll differentiation, we again find strong tax exporting behavior by the 
regional government, leading to high cost recovery ratios even in the presence of high 
fixed capacity cost shares. But, if for some reason only local demand can be tolled 
then cost recovery is indeed a problem.  
We also can extend the model to a setting of a transport corridor that passes 
through several regions, where we allow for tax and capacity competition between the 
regions (as in De Borger et al. (2007)). Again, this does not change the basic insight 
that a higher fixed cost share of capacity raises regional welfare. Tax competition 
between the regions does imply that toll levels are reduced compared to the case 
analyzed in Section 2.2 above, due to reactions of the other regions. A toll increase in 
a given region along a transport corridor will lead the other regions to react by 
somewhat reducing toll levels.   13
To elaborate on the case of a transport corridor with competing regions, first 
consider the simplified case without tolling. In Appendix 3, we show the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 3:  
 
Assume linear demand, user cost and capacity cost functions, and consider a 
capacity game between two regional governments that each maximize regional 
welfare; both regions face local and through traffic. Comparing cost structures 
along an isocost and isocapacity line then imply that the welfare effect of a higher 
share of fixed costs is theoretically ambiguous. Under plausible conditions, 
however, it is positive. 
 
The reason for the ambiguity in general is that the cost structure affects welfare in two 
different ways. First, as in the case of a single region, a higher share of fixed costs in a 
region raises local welfare, conditional on capacity investment in the other region. 
Second, however, in a Nash capacity game the cost structure in one region implies 
strategic responses by the other region. These were obviously absent in the analysis 
with only one region. Capacity cost changes in A affect optimal capacity in A and, 
hence, strategic reactions for optimal capacity in B. Depending on the size of these 
strategic effects and the slope of capacity reaction functions, this second effect may 
strengthen or weaken the direct welfare-enhancing effect of higher fixed costs. 
If we consider the impact of cost structure changes in the full capacity-tolling 
game between the two countries, the theoretical analysis becomes highly intractable. 
We resort to numerical analysis in section 3 to learn more about the role of fixed 
capacity costs on capacities, tolls and welfare.  
Finally, we could also generalize the linear capacity cost functions to more 
general non-linear forms. The isocost-isocapacity locus concept can be generalized to 
any non linear capacity function, introducing any number of parameters for the non 
linear cost function. For the basic intuition that moving to a higher fixed cost share 
function is beneficial to hold, one needs that along the locus, an increase in the fixed 
cost share is compensated by a decrease in the marginal capacity cost. 
 
 
2.4. The capacity cost structure and the selection of investment projects by regions  
   14
  The suggestion that a capacity cost structure with a high share of fixed costs is 
a good thing for the regions’ welfare has still other important implications, provided 
one is willing to interpret different cost structures in a slightly different way. Let us 
interpret different combinations (F,k) as reflecting different investment ‘projects’, 
assuming one of many different projects could be executed. For example, various rail 
and road investment projects may be characterized by very different proportions of 
fixed and variable capacity cost shares. Moreover, let us say that a project is 
beneficial from a global or federal perspective if it generates positive total (extra) 
welfare for local and through traffic users together; a project is beneficial for the 
region where the investment takes place if it generates positive extra regional welfare. 
A corollary of the propositions in the previous subsections is then that the region is 
more inclined to select federally interesting projects the higher the share of fixed 
costs. Moreover, several straightforward results on the effect of tolling immediately 
follow.  
  To see this, assume that a region A will only undertake projects for which the 
welfare contribution, denoted WA, is positive:  ( , ; , ) 0 AA A WZ k F θ ≥  where the policy 
variables indexed by A stand for the choices made by the regional government. 
Suppose that the project also benefits foreign users; the surplus of these users is 
captured by  ( , ; , ) TAA WZ k F θ , assumed to be positive. As regional governments do not 
take into account the consumer surplus of these foreign users, this may imply that 
some projects that are beneficial for the “federation” as a whole (projects for which 
(, ; ,) (, ; ,)0 AA A TA A W Z kF W Z kF θ θ +≥ ) are not undertaken by the individual region. 
However, since WA is an increasing function of the share of fixed costs (as shown in 
the previous section) and assuming that through traffic welfare is positive, it follows 
that, along an isocost and isocapacity locus, the higher is the level of fixed costs, the 
higher is the probability that a regional government undertakes a federally beneficial 
project. The policy implication of this finding is clear, viz., that federal support for 
regional projects becomes less (and not more) necessary when the share of fixed costs 
rises.  
  The above discussion can easily be extended to derive several interesting 
propositions on the effect of tolling on the willingness of an individual region to 
execute federally beneficial projects. Again denote by  ( , ; , ) AA A WZ F k θ the maximum 
welfare region A achieves for a given cost structure and the optimal toll selected by   15
the region. Similarly, let  (, ' ; , ) AF B A WZ F k θ be the maximum welfare attainable for the 
given cost structure and first-best optimal tolls (marginal social cost pricing imposed 
by the federal level). The capacity  'A Z  is the capacity chosen by the region given that 
tolls have to be at marginal social cost, as required by the federal authorities. We 
further denote  (, ;, ) TAA WZ F k θ and  (, ' ; , ) TF B A WZ F k θ  as the corresponding welfare 
levels for the through traffic users. Finally,  ( *; , ), ( *; , ) AA TA W Z Fk W Z Fkare the 
welfare levels in region A and for through traffic users in the absence of tolling; the 
corresponding capacity level is then  * A Z .  
  Now note the following relations. First, both  (, ;, ) AA A WZ F k θ and 
(, ;, ) TAA WZ F k θ are increasing in F along an isocost-isocapacity line. Second, a region 
cannot be worse off if it has access to tolling compared to the case without tolls, so 
that  
     (* ; , ) (,; , ) AA A AA WZ F k W ZF k θ <  
Third, by definition of first-best pricing, it is the case that: 
       ( ,; , ) ( ,; , ) (, ' ; , ) (, ' ; , ) A A A T A A A F BA T F BA W Z Fk W Z Fk W Z Fk W Z Fk θ θθ θ +< +  
Using these relations, we easily show that allowing a region or region to 
decide on tolls in the region raises the number of federally beneficial projects that the 
region will autonomously want to execute. This directly follows from the finding that 
tolling raises regional welfare. Moreover, it also follows that imposing marginal 
social cost pricing on the region raises overall welfare but decreases the number of 
federally beneficial projects that the region will want to execute. This statement 
follows because first-best tolls must necessarily reduce regional welfare compared to 
regionally optimal tolls. 
We summarize our finding from this subsection in the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 4: In a region facing both local and through traffic demand: 
(i)  The higher the fixed cost of a project along an isocost-isocapacity line, 
the more likely a region is to execute a federally beneficial project.  
(ii)  Starting from a no tolling equilibrium, allowing uniform tolling 
implies that more projects that are worthwhile from the federal 
viewpoint will be regionally implemented. 
(iii)  Starting from a uniform tolling equilibrium decided by a regional 
government, imposing first-best tolls on regions improves federal 
welfare, but it decreases the number a projects taken on by an 
individual region.    16
 
 
3. Numerical illustration 
 
  In this section we look at the effect of increasing fixed costs and decreasing 
variable costs on pricing, capacity investment, taxes, demand, welfare and cost 
recovery. After briefly discussing calibration of the model, we first consider the 
situation when there is only local traffic. Both the case with and without tolling is 
considered. Then we introduce through traffic and analyze the changes this implies; 
again, the case with and without tolling are considered. In a final subsection, we 
report on the results of other tolling regimes and multiple competing regions.  
For the numerical application we use linear demand and user cost 
specifications. We prefer the linear demand function because we want a choke price 
above which demand drops to zero
7. A linear user cost function is used for purposes 
of analytical tractability; moreover, it can be formally justified in a bottleneck type of 
congestion model (Arnott, de Palma, Lindsey (1993)). Specifically, we use the 
following demand and user cost functions:  












α βα β =+ =+  
3.1 Calibration 
  We will study the implications of the capacity cost structure for different 
regimes: with and without through traffic, with and without tolling, etc. For all 
regimes considered, we start with the same constant returns to scale capacity cost 
function ( ) CZ k Z = ; hence, k was taken to be the same for all regimes. The variable 
capacity cost k was calibrated in De Borger et al. (2007) such that, in the no-toll 
reference equilibrium, local and through traffic demand each account for 50% of total 
traffic in the region studied, and that the share of other costs and time costs are equal. 
Moreover, the demand elasticities equal -0.31 for local traffic and -0.13 for through 
traffic 
8. The calibrated unit (variable) cost of capacity was equal to €18.69. This 
value was used for all regimes studied in this paper as well. 
                                                 
7 A simple alternative is a constant elasticity demand function, but this implies an infinite willingness 
to pay for very low quantities so that the transport service is always provided. 
8 The parameters used are a=567,114; b=0,3356 ; c=283,557; d=0,1677; α=34,335; β=23,924.    17
  For each regime, we then proceeded as follows. Starting from the constant 
returns to scale situation, i.e., using k0=€18.69 and  0 0 F = , we determined the optimal 
Z* and the associated total cost  ( *) CZ for this regime. We then allow the variable 
capacity cost to decrease and, simultaneously, the fixed cost to increase in such a way 
that, for a given Z*, the total cost, ( *) CZ , remains constant. Note that this defines the 
isocost-isocapacity line for the regime under consideration. Of course, the isocost-
isocapacity line differs between regimes because the optimal capacity level Z*, and 
hence the total cost, depend on whether tolling is possible and whether through traffic 
is present.  
 
3.2. Effects of the capacity cost structure: The case of a single region without through 
traffic 
  We first look at the effect on the investment decisions of a given region when 
the variable component of capacity cost decreases and the fixed component increases 
and there is no possibility of through traffic. The results of varying the share of fixed 
and variable capacity costs are presented in Tables 1a (tolls are used) and 1b (no 
tolls), as well as in Figure 2.  
  Consider Table 1a. The first two lines show some (k,F) pairs along the isocost-
isocapacity line, determined as described above. To be more precise, all these variable 
and fixed cost pairs produce, for the optimal capacity under constant returns to scale 
(which equals Z*=1395 for this regime), the same total capacity cost (equal to 
C(Z*)=26080). The rest of the table gives, among others, the impact on demand, tolls, 
capacity levels and welfare. Results are easily interpreted. First note that optimal 
capacity provision rises when the fixed cost component increases. This is quite 
intuitive, due to the smaller marginal cost of capacity expansion. Higher capacity 
further implies lower congestion. Tolls on transport use, which are equal to  the local 
marginal external costs (see the theoretical section 2.1), also reduce markedly due to 
the large decrease in congestion. The increase in demand is relatively small.  
As expected, the degree of returns to scale has implications for the relation 
between toll revenues and total capacity costs. The latter have risen because of much 
higher capacity investments. Toll revenues go down when fixed capacity costs 
become more important, due to substantially lower tolls on just slightly more demand.   18
Cost recovery becomes therefore less favorable. This is as predicted by the theory. 
Figure 2 represents the results for this case graphically. 
In Table 1b, we report the results in the case the region for some reason cannot 
or does not want to use tolls, and only determines investment optimally. The results 
are very similar in all relevant respect to those of Table 1a, except of course for 
demand levels; these are higher due to the absence of tolls.  
 
  
k 18.69  16.82 14.95 9.35 5.61 3.74 1.87 
F 0  2608 5216 13040 18256 20864 23472 
θ   21.15 20.06 18.91 14.95 11.58 9.46 6.69 
Y 1233  1246 1260 1307 1347 1373 1406 
Z 1395  1486 1594 2091 2783 3472 5029 
C(Z) 26080  27609 29046 32585 33861 33845 32872 
Toll revenue  26080  25001 23830 19545 15605 12981 9400 
Cost recovery  1.0  0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 
W region  127602  127685 127952 130297 134027 137200 142288 
    
 

























Figure 2:  Percentage changes in key parameters as a function of fixed (and 
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k   18.69  16.82 14.95 9.35 5.61 3.74  1.87
F 0  2608 5216 13040 18256 20864  23472
Y 1353  1360 1368 1393 1415 1428  1445
Z 1461  1553 1660 2159 2852 3542  5099
C(Z) 27317  28727 30044 33219 34246 34104  33002
W region  126332  126538 126930 129652 133637 136939  142156
    
Table 1b: Single region, effect of changes in the cost structure (no tolls, no 






3.3 Case of a single region with through traffic  
 
Tables 2a-2b report the results when through traffic is present. In the reference 
case used for calibration, it is assumed that through traffic accounts for 50% of total 
traffic in the absence of tolls. Note that, as explained above, the ( , kF ) pairs differ 
from those in table 1, because this regime produces a different optimal capacity and 
optimal capacity cost under constant returns to scale capacity expansion.  
Apart from toll levels and cost recovery, the results are again quite similar for 
the cases with and without tolling. As before, decreasing the size of the variable 
capacity costs raises optimal capacity levels, and welfare rises. There is also a marked 
increase in investment in capacity whereas both local and through traffic demands 
increase only slightly. 
The crucial difference between Tables 2a and 1a obviously relates to tolling 
behaviour and cost recovery. Tax exporting implies that the uniform toll in Table 2a is 
very high. Moreover, contrary to the case without through traffic, it only marginally 
declines for higher shares of fixed capacity costs. To understand this, remember that 
the optimal uniform toll consists of two components (see (12)), viz., the local 
marginal external cost and a tax exporting component that depends on the importance 
of through traffic and the sensitivity of demand. The local marginal external cost 
slightly declines when fixed capacity costs are more prominent (due to lower volume-
capacity ratios), which reduces the toll. The tax exporting component, however, 
slightly increases due to higher through traffic demand.  
  Considering the cost recovery issue note that, unlike in the case without 
through traffic, tax exporting implies that the uniform tolls generate much more 
revenues than required to finance capacity costs. Funding is not a problem at all,   20
given that the region decides on tolling (and hence charges high tolls) and investment 
levels. Note also that cost recovery ratios do not monotonically decline when fixed 
costs become more important.  
  Comparing the welfare effects reported in the bottom rows of Tables 1a and 2a 
suggests that, in the case tolling is possible, the presence of through traffic is likely to 
raise welfare. Note that the regions’ welfare in the case of zero through traffic 
amounts to 127602 at the reference case with zero fixed costs; welfare with through 
traffic amounts to 217217, reflecting huge transport tax revenues.
9 However, when 
through traffic cannot be tolled (compare Table 1b and 2b), adding through traffic 
flows reduces welfare. It amounts to 126332 without through traffic (zero fixed cost 




k 18.69 16.82 14.95 9.35 5.61 1.87 
F 0 3381 6761 16904 23665 30426 
θ   143.77 143.23 142.65 140.67 138.99 136.54 
Y 502 512 522 558 588 632 
X 1096 1101 1106 1124 1139 1161 
Z 1809 1924 2060 2691 3567 6413 
C(Z) 33807 35745 37566 42051 43667 42414 
Toll revenue  229843 231060 232329 236576 240024 244760 
Cost recovery  6.8 6.5 6.2 5.6 5.5 5.8 
Welfare region  217217 217322 217661 220632 225359 235827 
Through traffic welfare  201633 203421 205321 211946 217667 226110 
Total welfare   418850 420743 422981 432578 443025 461937 





k 18.69 16.82 14.95 9.35 5.61 1.87 
F 0 3381 6761 16904 23665 30426 
Y 1291 1302 1313 1351 1382 1427 
X 1490 1496 1501 1520 1536 1558 
Z 2011 2171 2327 3046 4043 7278 
C(Z) 37239 39906 41555 45372 46339 44030 
Welfare region  101681 102232 103051 107738 113992 126773 
Through traffic welfare  279604 284276 289212 306220 320661 341605 
Total welfare  381285 386509 392263 413958 434653 468378 
Table 2b: Single region with local and through traffic demand 
(No tolls) 
 
                                                 
9 Total welfare (including the welfare of through traffic users) in the tables is calculated on the basis of 
(8).   21
 
To conclude this subsection, we briefly compare the results with the first-best 
‘global’ optimum, i.e., the optimal pricing and investment policy that does take 
account of the welfare of through traffic users when making decisions; this optimum 
is derived from objective function (8). One easily shows that this implies setting tolls 




) that captures both 
locals and through traffic time losses. The numerical results (not reported) again show 
that capacities and welfare are both rising when the share of the fixed cost becomes 
more important. Not surprisingly, cost recovery associated with optimal behaviour at 
the federal level is again problematic when there are fixed infrastructure costs.  
Together with the results in Table 2a, this illustrates again the dilemma for 
federal authorities. When there are high fixed costs, toll-capacity setting by regions 
does not pose serious funding problems but, of course, global welfare is lower than at 
the global optimum. The latter, however, implies less than full cost recovery and 
hence funding problems. If there are fixed costs, the trade-off is clear. The ‘federal’ 
level can impose efficient pricing and investment but then needs to support funding, 
or it can allow regions to toll through traffic. This implies funding is no problem but 
results in welfare losses at the federal level.     
 
3.4. The role of fixed capacity costs in a serial transport corridor. 
 
In this sub-section we finally briefly report on application of some extended 
models. We studied alternative pricing instruments together with tax competition in a 
serial transport corridor with two regions. In a serial transport corridor, through traffic 
passes through two regions that each have also local traffic on their network. Both 
regions play a game in capacity and tolling (see De Borger et al. (2007)). Next to 
uniform tolling and no tolling we study two more pricing regimes: differentiated tolls 
for local and through traffic and a regime where only local users can be tolled. The 
results that are reported are highly intuitive and do not change the main insights from 
this paper; for example, in all cases we found higher fixed cost shares to increase 
welfare and to raise capacity. 
The results are presented in Tables 3a to 3d and in Figures 3 to 6 below. A 
number of trends are common to all the results. Decreasing the size of the variable 
capacity costs raises optimal capacity levels, independent of the tolling regime.   22
Welfare rises in all cases as well. The welfare is in fact positive in all cases but is 
highest with differentiated tolling, where tax revenue can be extracted from foreign 
traffic, and lowest with no toll.  
  In the regimes with differentiated tolling and local tolls only we observe a 
large decrease in the local toll, as local marginal external costs decrease in line with 
congestion. The through traffic toll rises slightly. For the uniform toll regime, the toll 
marginally declines. To understand this, note that the optimal uniform toll consists of 
two components (see De Borger et al (2007)), viz., the local marginal external cost 
and a tax exporting component that depends on the importance of through traffic and 
the sensitivity of demand. The second component is numerically most important. The 
local marginal external cost declines when fixed capacity costs are more prominent, 
which reduces the toll. The second component, however, increases. This leads to the 
resulting small decrease in tax in this case.    23
 
k 18.69 16.82 14.95 9.35 5.61 1.87 
F 0 3025 6050 15125 21176 27226 
θA 104.67 104.42 104.15 103.23 102.44 101.29 
YA 732 741 749 779 804 841 
X 732 741 749 779 804 841 
ZA 1618 1724 1849 2428 3233 5847 
C(Z) 30251 32030 33701 37819 39304 38154 
Tax revenue  153333 154652 156039 160764 164706 170301 
Cost recovery  5.1 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.5 
Welfare region  168093 168631 169414 173809 179617 191439 
Through traffic welfare  90023 92017 94152 101729 108430 118584 
Total welfare  426209 429279 432979 449348 467664 501462 
Table 4a: Serial corridor with local and through traffic  
(uniform toll, capacity-toll competition) 
 
 
k 18.69 16.82 14.95 9.35 5.61 1.87 
F 0 3025 6050 15125 21176 27226 
tA 22.32 21.19 19.99 15.85 12.30 7.12 
τA 160.39 160.70 161.01 162.10 163.02 164.35 
YA 1219 1233 1247 1296 1339 1400 
X 396 401 407 425 440 463 
ZA 1732 1845 1979 2599 3461 6261 
C(Z) 32371 34063 35641 39414 40582 38929 
Tax revenue  90793 90614 90395 89404 88268 86132 
Cost recovery  2.8 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 
Welfare region  183147 184048 185220 191003 198044 211743 
Through traffic welfare  26363 27025 27736 30277 32549 36028 
Total welfare  392658 395121 398176 412284 428636 459514 
Table 4b: Serial corridor with local and through traffic 




k 18.69 16.82 14.95 9.35 5.61 1.87 
F 0 3025 6050 15125 21176 27226 
tA 14.43 13.72 12.97 10.33 8.04 4.68 
YA 1215 1229 1244 1295 1338 1401 
X 1301 1311 1321 1356 1386 1428 
ZA 1945 2073 2226 2930 3909 7086 
C(Z) 36346 37904 39330 42512 43096 40471 
Tax revenue  17536 16865 16127 13370 10764 6557 
Cost recovery  0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Welfare region  105005 105659 106575 111509 117869 130641 
Through traffic welfare  283945 288248 292812 308677 322315 342356 
Total welfare  493956 499566 505961 531695 558054 603639 
Table 4c: Serial corridor with local and through demand 
(local toll only, capacity-toll competition) 
   24
k 18.69 16.82 14.95 9.35 5.61 1.87 
F 0 3025 6050 15125 21176 27226 
YA 1300 1310 1320 1356 1386 1428 
X 1300 1310 1320 1356 1386 1428 
Z 2000 2129 2281 2986 3965 7142 
C(Z) 37383 38837 40159 43030 43407 40575 
Welfare region  104395 105107 106082 111195 117678 130577 
Through traffic welfare  283557 287888 292481 308451 322170 342303 
Total welfare  492348 498103 504645 530842 557527 603456 
Table 4d: Serial corridor with local and through traffic 
(No tolls, capacity competition) 
 
  As in the case without through traffic, there is also a marked increase in 
investment in capacity whereas both local and through traffic increase only slightly. 
Although relative increases in capacity are similar for all pricing regimes, in absolute 
terms there is greater investment in capacity when no pricing instruments are 
available or through traffic cannot be tolled.  There is less investment with uniform 
tolls than with differentiated tolls because further investment would not bring 
additional revenue from through traffic as this would also penalise local users. 
  Considering the cost recovery issue note, unlike in the case without through 
traffic, the uniform (Table 3a) and differentiated tolling (Table 3b) cases generate 
more revenues than required to finance capacity costs. Note, however, that (contrary 
to expectations), cost recovery is apparently easiest with uniform tolls. Moreover, cost 
recovery ratios do not monotonically decline when fixed costs become more 
important (again, contrary to expectations). When only local tolls (Table 3c) can be 
used, a substantial deficit occurs; it rises in the share of fixed costs, as predicted by 
the theory. These results show that funding of infrastructure is hardly a problem in 
tax-capacity games as long as countries are allowed to toll through traffic. However, it 
again points at a dilemma: financing of investment is not a problem in this case, but 
allowing countries to toll through traffic is not welfare improving (also see below, 
federal solution).      
  The welfare effects reported in Tables 1,2 and 3 can be interpreted also in a 
slightly different way. They show that in the cases where through traffic can be tolled 
(uniform and differentiated tolling cases) the introduction of through traffic is likely 
to raise welfare. However, when through traffic cannot be tolled, we expect welfare to 
go down if through traffic is introduced. For example, compare the welfare levels in 
Table 1a and Tables 3a and 3b. The introduction of through traffic combined with    25
tolls raises welfare. Now compare Table 1a with Tables 3c and 3d. Introducing non 


















Figure 3:  Percentage changes in key parameters as a function of fixed (and 





















Figure 4:  Percentage changes in key parameters as a function of fixed (and 
variable) capacity costs with uniform toll , serial transport corridor case  
















Figure 5:  Percentage changes in key parameters as a function of fixed (and 















0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
F




Figure 6:  Percentage changes in key parameters as a function of fixed (and 
variable) capacity costs with no toll, serial transport corridor case  
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  Finally, in Table 4 we present the ‘federal’ solution to the two region serial 
corridor price-capacity problem. This implies uniform tolls equal to the global 
marginal external cost (taking into account time losses imposed on through traffic). 
Again, capacity and welfare is rising in fixed cost; cost recovery declines in fixed 
cost. Obviously, cost recovery associated with optimal behaviour at the federal level 
is again problematic when there are fixed infrastructure costs. Together with the 
results in Table 3, these findings illustrate again the dilemma for federal authorities. 
Even when there are high fixed costs, toll-capacity competition does not pose serious 
funding problems as long as through traffic can be tolled; however, toll-capacity 
competition is welfare-reducing. To solve funding problems, two options are open. If 
there are fixed costs, the federal level can impose efficient pricing and investment but 
then needs support funding, or it can allow regions to toll through traffic. This implies 
funding is no problem but results in welfare losses at the federal level.     
 
 
k 18.69 16.82 14.95 9.35 3.74 1.87 
F 0 3025 6050 15125 24201 27226 
θA 21.15 20.06 18.91 14.95 9.46 6.69 
YA 1233 1246 1260 1307 1373 1406 
X 1233 1246 1260 1307 1373 1406 
ZA 2791 2972 3187 4183 6945 10058 
C(Z) 52160 53027 53710 54216 50163 46025 
Tax revenue  52160 50002 47660 39091 25962 18800 
Cost recovery  1.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 
Welfare region  127602 127268 127118 128211 133864 138534 
Through traffic welfare  255204 260586 266337 286674 316129 331520 
Total welfare  510409 515121 520573 543096 583856 608588 







In this paper we ask what the implications are for welfare and for cost 
recovery when governments decide on capacity investment and user charges for a 
transport infrastructure that implies large fixed capacity costs. We obtain some 
interesting results. First, we show that an infrastructure that has ceteris paribus a 
higher share of fixed costs raises welfare for the regional government building it. This 
implies that it increases (and not reduces) the incentives for the regional government   28
to invest in it so that it requires less (rather than more) federal subsidies. This holds 
both in the case the infrastructure is only used by local inhabitants and in the case a 
region faces a lot of through traffic. Second, we find that, even for capacity 
characterized by very high shares of fixed costs, financing of infrastructure is 
generally not an important issue as long as regions are allowed to toll through traffic . 
Third, if member states cannot toll through traffic, or if a federal authority (such as 
the EU or the federal level in the USA) can impose pricing at the global marginal 
social cost, our analysis shows that this reduces investment incentives for the 
individual regions, and subsidies may be needed.  
The difficulty of cost recovery and the associated funding problems in the case 
of high fixed costs largely explain recent EU policy to focus subsidies much more on 
rail and inland waterway investments (infrastructure with high fixed costs) than on 
road. Our results suggest that the emphasis on infrastructures with high fixed capacity 
costs may be inappropriate. Moreover, our results suggest that the EU should not 
necessarily subsidize the provision of infrastructure if tolling can be decided by the 
member states, because cost recovery will typically not be a problem. Finally, the 
analysis of this paper clearly identifies a dilemma for a federal authority: either one 
allows countries to decide on tolling and avoids funding problems, but at the expense 
of lower global welfare, or one imposes optimal tolling from the federal perspective 
on the regions, but at the expense of lower investment incentives at the regional level.    29
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 
  Start from the optimal capacity and corresponding capacity cost for the case of 
an infrastructure with constant returns to scale (zero fixed cost). Denote the variable 
cost of capacity by 
* k ; optimal capacity is denoted 
* Z , hence optimal capacity cost 
for this case is 
** * Ck Z = .  
Then consider the isocost/isocapacity structure 
** Ck Z F − =  describing all 
combinations of fixed and variable cost ( , Fk ) that yield, for the given capacity 
* Z , 
the same  total cost 
* C . This isocost-isocapacity line can be written as: 
 
** () Fkk Z =−  (A1) 





reg WP y d y g Y Y F k Z θ =− + − − ∫  






reg WP y d y g Y Y k Z k Z Z θ =− + − + − ∫             (A2) 
Now consider the welfare impact of a change in the cost structure along an isocost-
isocapacity line. Specifically, consider a change in variable cost k (and, hence, a 
corresponding change in fixed cost); the effect on welfare is given by: 
 
opt Z dW W W





where we have deleted the subscript  reg  to save on notation, and
opt Z is the optimal 
capacity associated with the welfare optimization program (A2). Noting that the first-













                  (A4) 
To show that an increase in the fixed cost along an isocost-isocapacity locus 
raises welfare it suffices to show that the right-hand-side of (A4) is negative, since 
higher variable cost is equivalent to lower fixed cost. To show that this is the case, 
note that, since 
* Z  corresponds to optimal capacity at variable capacity cost 
* k , the 
inequality 
* opt Z Z >  will hold provided that  0
opt Zk ∂ ∂<. But this directly follows 
from the first order condition on capacity,  0 dW dZ = , which evaluated at the 
optimum took the form (see expression in  the main body of the paper) 
 
22 '( ) 0
opt CY kZ − =  (A5) 
 Indeed, letting f denote the left hand side of (A5), the implicit function theorem tells 












 (A6)   31
The denominator of (A6) is negative by the second order condition for optimal 









(A6) is negative. This completes the proof.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2  
  In the case of through traffic we analogously show that higher fixed costs 
along an isocost-isocapacity line raises welfare. First, following the same logic as in 
the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix 1 (substituting (A1) in the objective function 






. Moreover, we again have 







                   
This will be negative provided  0
opt Zk ∂ ∂<. 
To show that this holds, note that for the case with through traffic, the first-order 
condition on capacity (see 13) can be written in the form 
2 () 0 GZ k Z − = , where the 
function ( ) GZ -- i.e., the left hand side of (13) -- is independent of k . Indeed, 
marginal investment costs do not appear in the optimal toll rule (12) nor in the 
demand and congestion functions. Denoting 
2 (, ) () 0 hkZ GZ k Z = −=  and again 
appealing to the implicit function theorem, we can therefore write 












The denominator is again negative by the second order condition for optimal 








. This completes the proof.  
 
Appendix 3: Summary proof of Proposition 3  
 
  Assume regions impose no tolls, but only compete in capacities. The first 
order conditions for optimal capacity in each region implicitly define the reaction 
functions in capacities. Solving these reaction functions, we can then write the Nash 
equilibrium capacities in general as a function of the variable cost parameters in the 
two regions:  












Welfare levels at the Nash equilibrium are obtained by substituting the Nash 
equilibrium capacities into the respective welfare functions; they can be written in 
general: 
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WW Z Z k
=
=
                (A7)   32
  To study the effect of an increase in the fixed cost share in A on welfare at the 
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Expression (A8) shows that the effect of a change in the cost structure has a direct and 
an indirect component. The first term on the right hand side is the direct effect. As in 
the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2, we again have: 











This can again be shown to be negative, using exactly the same procedure as before. 
So the direct effect of higher fixed cost shares is to raise welfare.  
  The second component on the right hand side of (A8) captures the effect of 
changes in the cost structure in A on welfare in A via the strategic response of region 
B. The cost change in A affects optimal capacity in B (because it affects capacity in A 
and hence through traffic, which induces B to optimally respond by adjusting 
capacity); the capacity change in B in turn affects welfare in region A. To study the 







 is easily 
shown to be negative. This makes intuitive sense: more capacity in B raises through 
traffic and, therefore, reduces welfare in A.  
  Finally, the effect of variable capacity cost in region A on Nash equilibrium 
capacities in B is ambiguous. However, differentiating system (A7) it easily follows 








has the same sign as the slope of the reaction function in 
capacities. This makes sense: if variable capacity cost in A rises along an isocost-
isocapacity line (hence fixed cost goes down) capacity in A will decline; this will 
reduce (raise) capacity in B if reaction functions are upward (downward) sloping. 
Although the numerical analysis suggests that reaction functions are very plausibly 
upward sloping, this need not generally be the case.  
  In summary, the first term on the right hand side of (A8) is negative, the 
second term is positive (negative) if capacity reaction functions are upward 
(downward) sloping. The numerical analysis suggests that the first term dominates, 
however, so that raising the fixed cost share is welfare improving. 
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